VPN vs. ZTNA: Why CIOs Need to Rethink Remote Access in 2026 

Flaws Critical in a series, emergency from agencies cybersecurity cybersecurity, campaigns ransomware fueled by credentials VPN stolen : the first half of 2026 has placed remote to the peak of priorities for CIOs. In addition,beyond the patches to be applied in urgently, these incidents raise a fundamental fundamental nature: the model of of the VPN, which is based on the exposure of an entry point on the Internet, is it still appropriate ? Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), and in particular its universal universal, offers a architectural architectural to this structural structural. Analysis. 

VPN, a model that has made useful but which reached its limits 

For more than twenty years, VPNs have been the standard solution for remote access: an authentication portal exposed to the Internet that, once logged in, opens an encrypted tunnel to the corporate network. This model worked perfectly in a world where most users were in the office and applications were in the data center. 

That world no longer exists. With widespread remote work, applications spread across data centers and the cloud, and a proliferation of service providers and unmanaged devices, the data flows that need to be secured have become more diverse—and so have the layers of security built up over the years: VPNs for employees, bastion hosts for administrators, and reverse proxies for third parties. Each layer adds operational complexity and, above all, an additional attack surface. 

2026: the evidence through facts

Recent events provide a concrete illustration of this vulnerability. According to Verizon’s 2026 DBIR report, which analyzes more than 22,000 data breaches, exploiting vulnerabilities is now the primary method attackers use to gain initial access. And exposed remote access devices are their prime target: 

• An authentication bypass (CVSS 9.8) in one of the most widely deployed SSL-VPN gateways on the market. The vulnerability allowed an unauthenticated attacker to bypass the login page and gain network access. Approximately 47,000 devices were exposed on the Internet; on February 26, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a mandatory directive requiring that the affected services be patched or disabled within 72 hours. 

• A large-scale credential theft campaign (June–July 2026). According to SOCRadar, approximately 74,000 stolen firewall and VPN credentials were in circulation, and at least 12 organizations were affected by ransomware deployed via compromised devices. Notably, this campaign did not rely on any previously unknown vulnerabilities—the mere existence of an exposed login portal was enough to make it a target for credential stuffing and brute-force attacks. 

• A critical vulnerability exploited in less than 24 hours. In late June 2026, a vulnerability affecting a widely used remote access gateway was exploited within 24 hours of its public disclosure, according to Lupovis—just a few weeks after two other vulnerabilities in the same device were added to CISA’s KEV (actively exploited vulnerabilities) catalog. 

• Remote code execution with root privileges (CVSS 10.0). A pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in an enterprise mobility gateway, actively exploited and added to the KEV catalog on June 11, 2026, with publicly available exploit code and compromised instances confirmed by the Shadowserver Foundation. 

• An authentication bypass via deprecated VPN configurations. On another major security gateway, outdated key exchange configurations (IKEv1) allowed unauthorized VPN connections to be established, with observed links to an affiliate of the Qilin ransomware. 

Let’s be clear: these incidents have affected several major, well-known software vendors, which are issuing fixes, publishing security advisories, and cooperating with regulatory agencies. The issue here is not the reliability of any particular vendor. The fact that several leading vendors have been affected by the same attack pattern is a sign of a systemic problem, not a problem with any specific vendor. 

Why are access are are structurally fragile

Traditional access architectures are based on assumptions that are being called into question by the current context. Four structural limitations emerge from the incidents of 2026: 

• An attack surface exposed by design. A VPN must be accessible over the Internet so that users can connect to it. This login page can be identified with a simple scan, and every new vulnerability instantly turns tens of thousands of devices into targets. 

• Network access rather than application access. Once the tunnel is established, the user—or the attacker who has stolen their credentials—gains access to a network segment, which is often poorly segmented. This is the starting point for lateral movement leading up to the deployment of ransomware. 

• A critical reliance on the speed of patching. When a vulnerability is exploited in less than 24 hours and agencies require patches to be applied within 72 hours, relying on the responsiveness of teams to ensure remote access security becomes a challenge that is difficult to sustain over the long term. 

• A costly stack to operate. VPN, bastion host, reverse proxy: so many solutions to manage, maintain, and patch—with as many points of exposure as there are components. 

The ZTNA: reverse the access of access

Zero Trust Network Access is based on a simple shift in approach: no one enters the network anymore; instead, applications are made available, one by one, to users who are continuously verified. This gives rise to three principles: 

• Never trust by default. Identity, device, and context are verified with every request, not just once when the tunnel is established. 

• Least privilege. The user accesses their application, never the network. A stolen credential alone grants no access, and never grants full access. 

• Invisibility. What is not exposed cannot be scanned or attacked. 

It is this last point that directly addresses the wave of vulnerabilities in 2026—and it is also on this point that ZTNA implementations differ the most from one another. 

The universal : Ekinops’ U-ZTNA from Ekinops

U-ZTNA (Universal ZTNA) from Ekinops applies logic Zero Trust all the way every aspect of the architecture, across the SDP SDP (Software-Defined Perimeter). 

No incoming port, zero where

The connectors U-ZTNA establish establish connections exclusively outbound : nor gateway from login, nor the administration, nor service for listening online. For a scanner, a botnet or a replayof stolen stolen, it is is nothing to be found. The first two steps of the attack of the attack observed in 2026—scanning the Internet, then attack the exposed service — have more target. And unlike to a common misconception, this applies also in deployment on-premise: even hosted within the scope of the company, the connectors extend, they don’t listen at all. 

A access via the app, never directly to the network

Identity, the terminal’s orientation, and the context are verified in continuously, at every request, by integration with the identity and and existing provider of the company. Even a that’s been compromised reachesjust one app: the scope radius is included by construction. 

Universal, to put it simply the existing system

Just one access of access covers the use cases that required in the past required VPN, bastion, and reverse proxy: employees in on the go, contractors, BYOD, work environments OT — across all device, anywhere. AgentlessAgentless access with integrated SSH/RDP bastion built-in and session session covers the cases where the deployment of an agent is possible. 

The control data management and compliance

Deployment as-a-service, dedicated or 100% on-premise: the data as the keys for encryption remain under control of the organization. Solution designed, developed and hosted in Europe, not subject to extraterritorial extraterritorial such as the Cloud Act, it aligns complies with the requirements of the GDPR and supports the implementation into compliance NIS2 and DORA. 

A Gradual Transition 

U-ZTNA coexists with firewalls and the VPN in place, on an application-by-application basis, without disrupting . CIOs can migrate first the most most sensitive — government, service providers, critical applications — and gradually gradually their exposed exposed, to their pace. 

This is need to to remember

Whereas a VPN exposes a scannable login portal and grants network access after a single verification, universal ZTNA has no incoming ports, grants limited access to the requested application, and continuously verifies identity, device, and context. This greatly reduces the reliance on the “patch race”: there are no longer any exposed services that need to be patched urgently. And where remote access previously relied on a stack of solutions, a single model now covers employees, administrators, contractors, and OT environments. 

Let’s be clear: no architecture guarantees absolute immunity, and it would be dishonest to claim otherwise. Residual risks remain—compromise of a workstation, an attack targeting the identity provider—and are addressed through continuous verification and the principle of least privilege. But the attack pattern that defined 2026—scanning the Internet for a gateway, exploiting the vulnerability of the day, or reusing stolen credentials, then moving laterally—has no hold on an architecture with no exposure: you cannot compromise what you cannot reach. 

For CIOs, the question is therefore no longer whether the remote access gateway will be the target of the next critical vulnerability, but whether the organization’s access model should continue to depend on that possibility. Universal ZTNA offers a pragmatic way forward: gradual, reversible, and aligned with European regulatory requirements. 

External sources cited 

Verizon DBIR 2026; CISA (KEV catalog—Known Exploited Vulnerabilities—and Operational mandatory dated February 26, 2026); SOCRadar ; Lupovis ; Shadowserver Foundation.